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ABSTRACT 
Objectives. Projection effects have been shown to bias respondent perceptions of peer 
delinquency, but network data required to measure peer delinquency directly are unavailable in 
most existing datasets. Some researchers have therefore attempted to adjust perceived peer 
behavior measures for bias via latent variable modeling techniques. The present study tested 
whether such adjustments render perceived peer coefficients equal to direct peer coefficients, 
using original data collected from 538 young adults (269 dyads). Methods. After first replicating 
projection effects in our own data and examining the degree to which measures of personal, 
perceived peer, and direct peer violence represent empirically distinct constructs, we compared 
coefficients derived from two alternative models of personal violence. The first model included 
an error-adjusted latent measure of perceived peer violence as a predictor, whereas the second 
substituted a latent measure of directly-assessed, peer-reported violence. Results. Results 
suggest that personal, perceived peer, and direct peer measures each reflect fundamentally 
separate constructs, but call into question whether latent variable techniques used by prior 
researchers to correct for respondent bias are capable of rendering perceived peer coefficients 
equal to direct peer coefficients. Conclusions. Research cannot bypass the collection of direct 
peer delinquency measures via latent variable modeling adjustments to perceived peer measures, 
nor should models of deviance view perceived peer and direct peer measures as alternative 
measures of the same underlying construct. Rather, theories of peer influence should elaborate 
and test models that simultaneously include both peer measures and, further, should attempt to 
identify those factors that account for currently unexplained variance in perceptions of peer 
behavior. 
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WHEN DIRECT PEER DELINQUENCY MEASURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE: THE 
UTLITY AND LIMITS OF LATENT VARIABLE APPROACHES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Peer delinquency remains among the strongest and most consistent predictors of personal 
delinquency in the existing criminological literature (Agnew, 1991; Warr, 2002). However, most 
studies continue to measure peer delinquency based on respondent perceptions of their peers’ 
behavior rather than peer’s own self-reports. Psychological research suggests that such perceived 
peer delinquency measures are inaccurate, because individuals mistakenly attribute their own 
behavior tendencies to others via such egocentric biases as false-consensus (Marks & Miller, 
1987) and projection (Newcomb, 1961). Perhaps as a result, the relationship between personal 
and peer delinquency is consistently much larger in studies that measure peer delinquency using 
respondent perceptions rather than directly-collected peer self-reports. (Aseltine, 1995; Haynie, 
2001, 2002; Haynie and Osgood, 2005; Meldrum et al., 2009; Weerman and Smeenk, 2005). 
The substantially weaker predictive power of direct, versus perceived, peer delinquency 
measures yields important implications for the interpretation of prior research and, ultimately, for 
delinquency-prevention policy. Insofar as perceived peer delinquency measures overestimate the 
etiological importance of actual peer behavior, delinquency prevention efforts that make use of 
this research may also be overestimating the delinquency-prevention effect of separating youth 
from delinquent peers. At the same time, however, collecting data directly from peers themselves 
via named rosters on which respondents identify their friends requires more time, involves more 
complex data management, and elicits greater concern for anonymity than does collecting peer 
data based on respondent perceptions. Thus, although perceived peer delinquency measures 
distort the true influence of peers on delinquency, such measures remain more common in 
delinquency studies than direct peer delinquency measures. 
Preliminary research (Matsuda and Anderson, 1998; Rebellon, 2012), however, suggests 
that latent variable statistical techniques can adjust perceived peer delinquency coefficients to 
account for false-consensus and projection. This research acknowledges that perceived peer 
measures are contaminated by biases such as false-consensus and projection, but estimates the 
correlations among the error terms for corresponding personal and perceived peer delinquency 
items in latent variable analysis to “control for this contamination” (Matsueda and Anderson, 
1998:291). Missing from the existing literature, however, is a formal test of the degree to which 
this method counteracts the artificial-inflation of the relationship between personal and peer 
delinquency that results from the use of perceived peer delinquency measures. After first 
examining whether measures of personal, perceived peer, and actual peer delinquency reflect 
separate theoretical constructs, the present study provides such a test. 
1.1 The Relationship between Personal and Perceived Peer Delinquency 
The strong correlation between self-reports of personal delinquency and perceptions of 
peer delinquency is well-established in the criminological literature. Traditionally, such research 
operationalizes personal delinquency via self-report scales comprised of multiple ordinal items 
probing substance behaviors such as alcohol, cigarette, and marijuana use, but sometimes 
probing the frequency of more serious delinquency (see Akers, 2009 for a review). The same 
research typically operationalizes perceived peer behavior using items that probe the proportion 
of a respondent’s friends that the respondent believes to have engaged in corresponding 
delinquent behaviors (e.g., Elliott et al., 1985). 
 Despite the strong and reliable correlation between personal and perceived peer behavior, 
there is considerable debate concerning its appropriate interpretation. First, some scholars 
interpret the correlation as evidence supporting Sutherland’s (1947) classic statement of 
differential association theory, which argues that an individual engages in any type of behavior 
as a function of repeated social interaction with associates who provide models of such behavior 
and who espouse a preponderance of attitudes favorable to that behavior. More recently, scholars 
have combined Sutherland’s theory with the reinforcement paradigm in behavioral psychology 
(Burgess and Akers, 1966) and have theorized that delinquency results from an overall learning 
process comprised of exposure to delinquent associates, behavioral imitation of such associates, 
adoption of attitudes favorable to delinquency, and post-hoc reinforcement for delinquent 
behavior (Akers and Lee, 1996).  Indeed, numerous longitudinal studies find that perceptions of 
peer delinquency at Time 1 are significantly associated with personal delinquency at Time 2 
even after controlling statistically for personal delinquency at Time 1 (e.g., Matsueda and 
Anderson, 1998; Meldrum et al., 2009). 
 A second interpretation of the correlation disputes whether peer delinquency causes 
personal delinquency. Instead, drawing on Glueck and Glueck’s (1950) observation that “birds of 
a feather flock together,” this view argues that the correlation reflects only the influence of 
personal behavior on the selection of similarly-delinquent social associates. To be certain, some 
scholars take a middle-ground view, acknowledging the possibility that personal and perceived 
peer behavior may be reciprocally related via simultaneous socialization and selection 
mechanisms (e.g., Akers, 2009; Kandel, 1996; Thornberry, 1987). Other scholars, however, 
remain skeptical that a reciprocal relationship exists, instead arguing that the correlation reflects 
only the “tendency of people to seek the company of others like themselves” (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990:156). Empirical research comparing these alternative views remains equivocal, 
with some findings suggesting evidence of only socialization (e.g., Akers and Lee, 1996), others 
suggesting evidence of only selection (e.g., Rebellon, 2012), and others suggesting bidirectional 
causality (e.g., Matsueda and Anderson, 1998; see also Kandel, 1980). 
 A third and final interpretation of the correlation between personal and perceived peer 
delinquency suggests that neither actually wields any causal influence over the other but rather 
that both are alternative measures of the same underlying construct. Indeed, most studies 
examining socialization and selection effects employ data from juveniles (but see Akers, 2009), 
who are particularly prone to commit delinquent acts in groups (Warr, 2002). As such, youth 
may attribute the same group behaviors to both themselves and to those with whom they co-
offend. By extension, respondent perceptions of peer delinquency “may merely be another 
measure of self-reported delinquency” (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990:157). As yet, only limited 
research has examined this issue empirically. What research exists has relied upon either 
exploratory (Agnew, 1991) or confirmatory (Zhang and Messner, 2000; Rebellon, 2012) factor 
analysis to examine whether measures of personal and perceived peer delinquency demonstrate 
what Campbell and Fiske (1959) have called “discriminant validity,” which exists when two sets 
of measures intended to reflect separate theoretical constructs are correlated at a value 
significantly less than 1.0. Results of such studies tend to suggest that “[m]easures of adolescent-
reported peer deviance… overlap considerably (but not perfectly) with measures of self-reported 
peer delinquency” (Zhang and Messner, 2000:334). 
1.2 Perceptual Bias among Measures of Perceived Peer Delinquency 
 Further complicating any interpretation of the correlation between personal delinquency 
and perceived peer delinquency is the reliable psychological finding that individuals’ perceptions 
of their peers’ attitudes and behaviors are systematically biased in the direction of respondents’ 
own attitudes and behaviors. The most commonly studied of such biases is referred to as the 
“false consensus effect,” whereby individuals who engage in a certain behavior or endorse a 
particular attitude overestimate the prevalence of the same behavior/attitude among others (e.g., 
Katz and Allport, 1931; Ross et al., 1977). Typically, research demonstrates evidence of false-
consensus in one of two ways. First, a researcher may divide his or her sample into one group of 
individuals who have engaged in a given behavior (or who endorse a given attitude) and another 
group of individuals who have (do) not. Evidence of false consensus is indicated to the degree 
that the former group’s average estimate of the given behavior/attitude’s prevalence is higher 
than that of the latter group. Second, if a researcher has access to data concerning the actual 
prevalence of a given behavior/attitude in a target population, he or she may ask a sample of 
individuals who have all engaged in a given behavior (or who all endorse a given attitude) to 
estimate the prevalence of the given behavior/attitude in the target population. In this case, 
evidence of false consensus is indicated to the degree that the sample’s average estimate of the 
behavior/attitude’s prevalence exceeds the actual prevalence in the target population. Regardless 
of the particular method employed, meta-analysis finds consistent evidence of false-consensus 
bias (Mullen et al., 1985). 
 Cognitive and social psychologists have offered four primary explanations for the false 
consensus effect. First, some scholars “believe that selective exposure is the primary factor 
generating misperception of the commonness of one’s preferred positions” (Marks and Miller, 
1987:77). Research, for example, finds that a person’s perception of the prevalence of smoking 
in the general population is correlated with the prevalence of smoking among the friends with 
whom he or she tends to associate (Sherman et al., 1984). Part of the false-consensus effect may 
therefore reflect individuals’ mistakenly attributing acquaintances’ tendencies to the broader 
population. At the same time, some research finds a greater, rather than smaller, false-consensus 
effect when the target population consists of friends or in-group members rather than people in 
general or out-group members (Holtz and Miller, 1985; Judd and Johnson, 1981). False 
consensus therefore seems to reflect something more than an inaccurate generalization of 
accurately perceived in-group characteristics. Some scholars therefore suggest that a second 
potential source of false consensus derives not from selective exposure to atypical individuals, 
but to the selective attention that individuals pay to typical individuals. In particular, “individuals 
may selectively attend to, utilize, and interpret information to which they are exposed” such that 
they focus attention disproportionately on behaviors and attitudes that match their own (Hymel, 
1986:432).  Illustratively, some research finds that false consensus can be increased by asking 
respondents to visualize, and hence focus attention upon, a behavior consistent with their prior 
behavioral tendencies (Kernis, 1984). 
A third potential source of false-consensus may stem from inferential errors in cognitive 
processing. Of note, the literature makes clear that “[i]naccurate estimates [of a given attitude or 
behavior’s prevalence] do not necessarily imply flawed reasoning” (Krueger and Clement, 
1994:596; see also Einhorn, 1986). Rather, a person’s own status on a given behavior/attitude is 
a valid piece of data that informs their inferences about the greater public, particularly over 
repeated trials and particularly when few other pieces of information are available (Dawes, 
1989). At the same time, the false-consensus effect is not eliminated when respondents are 
informed that another individual holds a countervailing status on a particular attitude or behavior. 
Instead of cognitively weighing equally their own behavior/attitude and another’s countervailing 
behavior/attitude, respondents who are explicitly taught about the false-consensus effect attribute 
false-consensus bias to those with countervailing positions while ironically continuing to exhibit 
the false consensus bias themselves (Krueger and Clement, 1994). Such findings suggest that a 
fourth potential source of the false-consensus effect may stem from motivational processes that 
are not “cognitive,” but that instead take place automatically when an individual experiences an 
emotional need for social self-enhancement or personal self-esteem maintenance (Marks and 
Miller, 1987). Of particular relevance, for example, research finds significant false-consensus 
effects when respondents are asked to estimate the prevalence of behaviors/attitudes that they 
hold but that are not universally approved (e.g., Sherman et al., 1984) and these results are 
stronger among adolescent respondents than among adult respondents (e.g., Sherman et al., 
1983). Thus, some evidence suggests that false-consensus may serve as an automatic, emotional 
means by which the adolescent psyche essentially “normalizes” delinquency. 
1.3 Implications for Understanding and Controlling Juvenile Crime and Delinquency 
 As should be expected in light of the false consensus literature discussed above, research 
suggests that youth who engage in deviant behavior tend to overestimate both the prevalence and 
frequency of such behavior among their friends (e.g., Iannotti and Bush, 1992; Pristein & Wang, 
1995; Urberg et al., 1990). Most of this research is focused on health risk behaviors with a 
number of studies finding evidence of robust false-consensus effects for such behaviors such as 
substance use (e.g. Iannotti and Bush, 1992; Kandel, 1980; Sherman et al., 1983; Urberg et 
al.,1990; Wolfson, 2000) and only preliminary evidence finding somewhat weaker false-
consensus effects for serious forms of delinquency like violence (Prinstein and Wang, 2005). 
Such effects may help to explain why correlations between personal and peer delinquency “are 
generally two to three times higher” when researchers operationalize peer delinquency via 
respondent perceptions rather than direct peer reports (Kandel, 1996:298). Specifically, the false 
consensus effect may artificially inflate the similarity that an individual perceives between 
his/her behavior and that of his/her associates. Thus, while studies using direct peer reports 
continue to yield equivocal evidence concerning whether socialization or selection better 
accounts for the correlation between personal and peer behavior (e.g., Kandel, 1978; Knecht et 
al., 2010, Weerman, 2011), they have simultaneously led some to conclude that “estimates of 
influence [i.e., socialization] are grossly overstated in analyses relying upon respondents’ 
perceptions of their friends’ behavior” (Aseltine, 1995:103; see also Haynie, 2001; Kandel, 
1996; Meldrum et al., 2009; Weerman and Smeenk, 2005). 
 Given that false-consensus effects may exaggerate the relationship between personal and 
peer delinquency in studies using perceptual measures of peer behavior, two critical questions 
arise about how to interpret prior research concerning peer influences on delinquency and about 
how best to conduct future etiological research on such influences. First, do perceived peer 
delinquency measures reflect only the composite of actual peer delinquency and measurement 
bias, or do perceived peer delinquency measures reflect a theoretical construct that is 
fundamentally distinctive from actual peer behavior? To the degree that perceived and direct 
peer delinquency measures reflect theoretically distinctive constructs rather than alternative 
indicators of the same underlying construct, criminological theory will need to pay greater 
attention to describing the manner in which both measures of peer delinquency may separately 
impinge upon personal behavior, as well as the manner in which both measures may be related to 
each other (see e.g., Jussim and Osgood, 1989). Further, insofar as perceptions of peer behavior 
influence personal delinquency but come from more than actual peer behavior and measurement 
bias, effective delinquency-prevention will require identifying the other sources of such 
perceptions. 
Second, can latent variable methods successfully counteract the artificial inflation of 
coefficients linking perceived peer delinquency with personal delinquency? Insofar as studies 
using perceived peer measures have overestimated the socializing influence of peers, 
interventions that aim to isolate youth from objectively-delinquent peers may be less useful for 
controlling delinquency than perceived peer coefficients imply. A more realistic expectation of 
such interventions’ effectiveness would be garnered from research examining the effect of 
directly-measured peer delinquency on respondent behavior. As yet, however, a majority of 
empirical studies in the criminological literature continues to employ perceived peer delinquency 
measures, perhaps as a result of the added time, effort, and confidentiality issues involved in 
collecting and managing network data like those available in the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (AddHealth). Thus, while limited research purports to control for false-
consensus bias (e.g., Matsueda and Anderson, 1998; Rebellon, 2012) via latent variable 
adjustments to perceived peer coefficients, such studies’ datasets have not included the direct 
peer measures necessary for verifying the effectiveness of such latent variable adjustments.  
1.4 The Present Study 
 The present study addresses the above two questions. It begins by attempting to replicate 
egocentric bias that has been unveiled in prior research. However, whereas much of the above-
cited research concerns false-consensus bias, whereby individuals’ own behaviors/attitudes bias 
their perception of a given behavior/attitude’s prevalence among peers, the present study uses 
dyadic data to examine the related issue of whether an individual’s own frequency of a given 
behavior leads him or her to misperceive the frequency with which one particular friend engages 
in the same behavior. While this bias has in some cases been subsumed under the umbrella term 
“false consensus” (e.g., Pristein and Wang, 2005), it is technically more akin to “projection,” 
whereby an individual incorrectly attributes his or her own tendencies unto specified others 
(Holmes, 1978; Newcomb, 1961). Criminological research finds evidence of projection effects 
that matches existing evidence concerning the false-consensus effect. In particular, research finds 
that respondents assume specified friends’ behavior is more similar in frequency to their own 
than is objectively warranted (e.g., Boman et al., 2012, Pristein and Wang, 2005). 
After examining whether the dyadic data that we have collected yield projection effects 
similar to those found in prior research, we examine whether perceived peer delinquency reflects 
a construct that is fundamentally distinctive from directly-measured peer delinquency. We test 
for discriminant validity (i.e., Campbell and Fiske, 1959) using latent variable modeling 
techniques outlined by Loehlin (1992) and used in prior criminological research to test 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) claim that personal and perceived peer delinquency are actually 
alternative measures of the same construct (e.g., Zhang and Messner, 2000; Rebellon, 2012). 
Specifically, we examine whether latent variable correlations between perceived and directly-
measured peer delinquency are significantly lower than 1.0 (as indexed by two standard errors).  
 Finally, we provide what we believe to be the first empirical test to examine whether 
latent variable modeling techniques (e.g., Matsueda and Anderson, 1998; Rebellon, 2012) are 
capable of adjusting structural estimates of the relationship between personal and peer 
delinquency to counteract the inflation that appears to exist among coefficients linking perceived 
peer behavior with personal delinquency. Such techniques have been discussed at length by 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998:291) who “…tested the hypothesis that measures of delinquent 
peers and delinquent behavior are contaminated due to (1) respondents’ imputing their own 
behavior to that of their friends, (2) respondents’ imputing friendship to those who share their 
delinquency, and (3) respondents reporting… rumors that are correlated with their own 
delinquent status” (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). According to Matsueda and Anderson 
(1998:291): “Each of these mechanisms implies that measurement errors for a specific measure 
of delinquent peers (e.g., peers’ breaking and entering) should be contemporaneously correlated 
with the corresponding measure of delinquent behavior (e.g., respondents’ breaking and 
entering).” Results of their study yielded significant error correlations, thus suggesting to 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998:291) that “in examining the reciprocal relationships between 
[perceptual measures of] delinquent peers and delinquent behavior, it is important to control for 
this contamination” (see also Rebellon, 2012). Implicit in Matsueda and Anderson’s (1998) 
analysis is the notion that, by estimating contemporaneous correlations among corresponding 
error terms for personal and perceived peer delinquency items, a researcher can bring structural 
estimates closer into line with those that would have emerged had direct measures of peer 
delinquency been available to use in place of perceived measures. 
 There exist, however, several reasons to question whether the above techniques are likely 
to close the entire gap between structural results from models using error-adjusted perceived peer 
measures and models using direct peer delinquency measures. Saris & Aalberts (2009) for 
example, suggest that the most probable explanation for significantly correlated disturbance 
terms is shared method variance, which exists when some unmeasured variable simultaneously 
affects manifest indicators of two ostensibly separate theoretical constructs (see also, Loehlin, 
1992). By extension, even assuming that significant error term correlations are unveiled, those 
error term correlations might reflect something other than egocentric biases like false consensus 
or projection. They may, for example, reflect the influence of a trait like self-control on an 
individual’s responses to both sets of measures or reflect the effect of co-offending on 
perceptions of both personal and peer behavior. Further, even if the error term correlations in 
question did successfully capture egocentric biases like false consensus and projection, it 
remains possible that, as discussed previously, perceived peer delinquency is a fundamentally 
separate construct that is theoretically distinctive from directly measured peer delinquency. 
Perceptions, for example, might come partly from actual peer behavior and partly from 
egocentric biases, but may simultaneously be affected by variables like exaggerated bragging, 
false rumors, or embellished gossip. Whether the error correlation estimates suggested by 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998:291) do or do not serve to “control for this contamination” 
remains an open question that has yet to be evaluated empirically. 
In the present study, we therefore use new data from young adult dyads to provide an 
empirical examination of this issue. In particular, we estimate two separate models of 
delinquency. In the first, we include a measure of peer delinquency derived from our primary 
respondents’ perceptions of their friends’ delinquency and allow error terms for perceived peer 
items to correlate with error terms for corresponding personal delinquency items. In the second, 
we remove the perceived peer measure and substitute a measure of peer delinquency derived 
directly from peer self-reports. To the degree that the perceived peer coefficient from the first 
model remains substantially larger in magnitude than the direct peer coefficient in the second 
model, results would call into question whether error-correlation adjustments are capable of 
counteracting the artificial inflation of perceived peer coefficients that would appear to result 
from projection and other sources of contamination. 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Participants and Procedure 
Given that the measures we needed were not all available in existing datasets, we 
collected original data from undergraduate student dyads in a university setting. Primary 
participants received course credit for their participation and were asked to bring a friend with 
them to the study. In order to facilitate respondents’ recruitment of friends, we promised 
prospective respondents that their friends would only be required to fill out a shortened version 
of our survey instrument. The study took place during the spring semester in order to ensure that 
freshmen respondents had time to form relations with their peers. Primary respondents and their 
friends were seated separately and filled out surveys independently. Permission was granted 
from appropriate IRB personnel, all participants were given an informed consent form, and 
emphasis was placed on maintaining anonymity by not including names on surveys. 
When a respondent-friend dyad came to the designated laboratory setting, we gave each 
member of the dyad a pre-arranged packet. Respondent packets contained a full survey 
(including gender, year in school, self-reported delinquency, perceived peer delinquency, and 
self-control measures). Friend packets contained a shorter survey (including demographic 
information and a self-reported delinquency scale). Surveys within each respondent-friend dyad 
were linked via an arbitrary ID number to allow matching of dyads while simultaneously 
maintaining anonymity. Upon completion of questionnaires, all participants were thoroughly 
debriefed. After dropping the four respondents who did not report being at least “somewhat 
close” with their chosen “friend”, our data collection yielded 269 dyads comprised of 538 
individuals. Each dyad included a primary respondent and one of his or her friends. In these 
dyads, seventy-five of our primary respondents were male with the rest being female. We first 
ran our analyses using all available dyads. To control for potential cross-sexed effects (e.g., 
McDougall and Hymel, 2007), we also re-ran analyses using only the 73% of dyads that were 
same-sex. Results of both sets of analyses were substantively identical and we therefore present 
only results from the full sample of dyads. Primary respondents were distributed across all four 
college levels, with a greater preponderance of freshmen and sophomores than juniors and 
seniors (Freshmen = 48%, Sophomores = 33%, Juniors = 13%, Seniors = 6%). Given IRB 
concerns about respondent identification in a setting of extremely limited racial diversity, we did 
not collect data concerning race or ethnicity, whose limited variance would likely not have 
yielded significant effects regardless. 
2.2 Measures 
Violence. Our study employs measures of respondent violence, measures of friend’s 
violence based on respondent perceptions, and measures of friend’s violence based on each 
friend’s self-reports. Responses for all sets of measures related to four behaviors: 
hitting/punching; pushing/shoving; kicking; and using force to take something from another 
individual. Responses to all violence items were based on a nine-point scale, ranging from 1 
(“Never in the past year”) to 9 (“Two to three times a day”), with high scores indicating high 
levels of delinquent behavior. This response range is derived from the National Youth Survey 
(Elliott et al., 1985), which has been used extensively in the existing delinquency literature. 
Items are listed in Table 1 along with descriptive statistics. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Low self-control.  We include self-control in our structural models for three reasons. 
First, low self-control is related to deficits in interpersonal skills, and inadequate relational 
functioning may help explain why some individuals are especially inaccurate in estimating their 
peer’s delinquent behavior. Illustratively, Gottfredson and Hirshi proposed that low self-control 
results in poor relational competencies (Gottfredson and Hirshi, 1990:157), and research has 
empirically related low self-control to poor quality relationships (Evans et al., 1997) and 
diminished interpersonal functioning (Tangney et al., 2008). By controlling for low self-control, 
our models attempt to account for errors in estimation that are attributable to weak interpersonal 
skills. Second, individual differences in self-control may also account for variability in the 
predisposition to associate with delinquent peer groups or to gravitate toward social situations in 
which the opportunity for delinquency is greater (e.g., Osgood et al., 1996). Because individuals 
who are low in self-control are also likely to congregate and co-offend together (e.g. McGloin, 
and Shermer, 2009; Wills and Dishion, 2004), partialling out self-control should, at least in part, 
control for divergent probabilities that a respondent has directly witnessed, co-offended, or 
otherwise deduced his peer’s involvement in antisocial behavior. Third, our data are cross-
sectional. As such, we cannot adjust directly for prior behavioral tendencies. However, 
accounting for self-control allows us to control for an individual’s disposition to commit crime, 
which appears to be relatively stable across time (Caspi et al., 2006).  For example, Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990) argue that interpersonal differences in self-control become fixed within the 
first decade of life, so that accounting for self-control should control for past, present, and future 
criminal propensity. Although there is some evidence of malleability in emotional regulation 
(e.g. Côté et al., 2002), several psychological studies also indicate that some dimensions of self-
control are relatively constant across the life-course (Caspi et al., 1997; Oliva et al., 2012, 
Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Likewise, a body of criminological work represents self-control 
as an enduring criminal propensity, albeit with a loss of some explanatory power across time 
(Pratt and Cullen, 2000). By controlling for self-control, then, in some measure our models 
account for previous criminal behavior. Self-control was therefore included in our primary 
respondent survey and was measured with the scale created by Grasmick et al. (1993). Responses 
were measured on a four point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 4 
(“Strongly agree”) and with high scores indicating low self-control. Based on Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s discussion of the major dimensions of low self-control (see also Grasmick et al., 1993), 
we constructed six subscales, each reflecting one of the six dimensions of self-control and each 
calculated as the mean of its four constituent items. 
2.3 Analytic Strategy 
We divide our analyses into three sets. The first provides an item-by-item analysis 
examining the degree to which there is projection bias among the respondents in our sample. For 
each of the four behaviors listed above, it compares the discrepancy between a respondent’s 
personal and perceived friend measure with the discrepancy between a respondent’s personal and 
direct friend measure. To eliminate negative values, we square each difference score.
1
 To the 
degree that respondents suffer from projection or false consensus bias, they should underestimate 
how different their friend’s behavior is from their own and, as such, the mean of squared 
perceived differences should be significantly lower than the mean of squared actual differences. 
 Our second set of analyses employs confirmatory factor analytic procedures outlined by 
Loehlin (1992) to provide a test of the theoretical structure underlying our personal delinquency, 
perceived peer delinquency, and actual peer delinquency items. In particular, we construct a 
three-factor latent variable model in which items reflecting primary respondents’ violence load 
on one factor, perceptions of peer violence load on a second, and directly-measured peer 
violence measures load on a third. We then use Lisrel 8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a) to estimate 
the inter-factor correlations in our model. Perceived measures of violence bear discriminant 
validity (see Campbell and Fiske, 1959) vis-à-vis the other factors insofar as their latent variable 
correlates with these other factors at a value that is significantly different from 1.0, as indexed by 
two standard errors. Following Loehlin (1992, pp. 66-67), we further compare the fit of our 
                                                 
1
 While some studies “have used a residual score approach to compute discrepancy scores” rather than a difference-
score approach, some research has used both methods simultaneously, “yielding discrepancy scores that were nearly 
identical (i.e., r’s >.95) to one another and producing an identical pattern of results” (Prinstein and Wang, 2005:297-
298). 
three-factor model with the fit of alternative measurement models in which (a) perceptions of 
peer violence load on the same factor as direct peer measures; (b) perceptions of peer violence 
load on the same factor as personal violence measures; and (c) all three sets of measures load on 
only a single factor. 
 Our third set of analyses employs two structural equation models to examine the 
etiological implications of measuring friends’ delinquency via respondent perceptions versus 
friend self-reports. The first model follows the measurement strategy of Matsueda and Anderson 
(1998) by modeling projection effects via the correlation between the error term for each 
manifest indicator of personal behavior and the error term for each corresponding indicator of 
perceived peer behavior. Matsueda and Anderson (1998) argue that each significant error 
correlation should capture the influence of projection, as well as such potential influences as 
false rumors and peer bragging, thus rendering the perceived peer coefficient similar in 
magnitude to the coefficient that would have resulted using direct peer measures to reflect peer 
behavior. However, whereas Matsueda and Anderson (1998; see also Rebellon, 2012) used data 
from the NYS that did not contain direct peer behavior measures with which to test empirically 
the notion that estimating such error correlations brings structural estimates of perceived peer 
behavior into line with those that emerge using direct peer measures, our data do allow for such a 
test. We perform this test by estimating a second structural equation model in which we 
substitute direct peer behavior measures for perceived peer behavior measures and by then 
comparing the structural relation between peer behavior and personal behavior across each 
model. 
2.4 Estimation Method 
Given that our respondent and peer delinquency items are positively skewed (see Table 
1) thus violating the maximum likelihood assumption of multivariate normality (Browne, 1984) 
and that Pearson correlations have been shown to underestimate the relations among ordinal 
measures (Muthén, 1984), we have opted not to rely on traditional maximum likelihood 
estimation using a Pearson correlation matrix. Instead, following prior research using ordinal 
measures similar to our own (e.g., Aseltine, 1995; Matsuda & Anderson, 1998; Rebellon, 2012) 
we first use the Prelis 2 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b) statistical package to compute polychoric 
correlations and their associated asymptotic covariance matrix. We then use these correlations 
and weights to estimate our measurement and structural equation models via the diagonally-
weighted-least-squares (DWLS)
2
 algorithm. This estimation strategy provides three primary 
benefits for our present purposes. First, “[r]ather than assuming normality among observed 
items, this asymptotic distribution-free method of estimation assumes normality of the latent 
structure underlying each item as well as bivariate normality underlying the estimated polychoric 
correlations” (Rebellon and Waldman, 2003:315). Second, simulation research (Babakus et al., 
1987:227) finds that, relative to alternative designs using ordinal data, “[t]he polychoric 
correlation produce[s] better results on the basis of the accuracy of parameter estimates and 
estimated standard errors.” Third, from a practical standpoint, prior research employing the 
error-adjustments whose integrity we wish to test (e.g., Matsueda and Anderson, 1998; Rebellon, 
2012) has used polychoric correlations. Thus, to examine whether the results of those studies 
using perceived peer measures do or do not reflect results that would have emerged had direct 
peer measures been available, we follow their methodology as closely as possible.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Models run via fully-weighted least squares estimation failed to converge, likely as a result of our models’ 
complexity and limited sample size. 
3
 One reviewer suggested that we consider an alternative strategy involving transforming our indicator items to 
reduce skew and estimating our models via the traditional maximum likelihood algorithm. We therefore ran an 
3. RESULTS 
Figure 1 presents the mean squared-difference between each respondent’s self-reported 
violence and each corresponding friend’s violence. The first bar in each pair depicts the mean 
squared-difference between personal violence and perceived friend violence while the second 
depicts the mean squared-difference between personal and directly-measured friend violence. 
Across each pair of bars, the first is smaller than the second, suggesting that respondents 
systematically overestimate the similarity between their own behavior and that of their friend. 
Our data therefore suggest that projection effects take place not only for the sexual and 
substance-related behaviors examined in the majority of existing psychology studies, but also for 
more severe forms of deviance like violence. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 2 examines whether the biases in perceived measures are (a) sufficiently large to 
render perceived peer violence a fundamentally distinct construct vis-à-vis directly-measured 
peer violence and (b) so large as to render perceived peer violence nothing more than an 
alternative measure of personal violence. Following prior research (e.g., Zhang and Messner, 
2000; Rebellon, 2012), it does so via confirmatory factor analysis. A number of results are 
noteworthy. First, all factor loadings are high and statistically significant, suggesting that 
pushing, hitting, kicking, and using force are, in fact, good indicators of an underlying behavioral 
tendency. Second, each of the statistics presented at the bottom left of Figure 2 suggests a good 
overall fit of the theoretical model to our data. Third, three error-correlations are positive, two of 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative set of models in which we (a) computed the natural log of each of our skewed indicator items; (b) 
computed traditional Pearson correlations; and (c) estimated all measurement and structural equation models via the 
maximum likelihood algorithm. Substantive results (available upon request) were identical to those presented herein, 
with one minor exception, noted below, that does not change our conclusions in any way. Because conclusions 
remained the same, and for the reasons discussed in our section entitled “2.4 Method of Estimation”, we present 
DWLS results using polychoric correlations. 
them to a statistically significant degree, and this is consistent with measurement bias as per 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998). Fourth, even after estimating the error correlations among 
corresponding items for personal and perceived peer behavior, perceived peer behavior is 
correlated significantly less than 1.0 with directly-measured peer behavior. Thus, insofar as each 
friend’s directly-measured self-reports of violence are taken to be a relatively valid baseline 
measure of actual behavior (see Huizinga and Elliott, 1986), respondent perceptions are not 
merely measurement-biased indicators of actual peer behavior but, instead, indicators of a 
construct that is fundamentally distinct from actual peer behavior. Fifth, personal behavior and 
directly-measured peer behavior are significantly correlated, but the magnitude of this correlation 
is much lower than the magnitude of the correlation between personal and perceived peer 
behavior. Finally, while the magnitude of the correlation between personal and perceived peer 
violence is extremely large in Figure 2, it differs significantly from a value of 1.0, as indexed by 
two standard errors, thus calling into question Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) assertion that 
indicators of personal and perceived peer delinquency are merely alternative indicators of the 
same underlying construct.
4
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Given clear evidence from Figure 1 that respondents systematically overestimate the 
similarity between their own behavior and that of their chosen friend, as well as clear evidence 
that the items depicted in Figure 2 reflected three distinct constructs, Figure 3 depicts a structural 
equation model estimating the latent variable correlation between personal and perceived peer 
                                                 
4
 For purposes of comparison, the three-factor model presented in Figure 2 fit the data better than did (a) a one-
factor model (2=525.10, df=7, p<.05); (b) a two-factor model in which perceived and direct peer behavior loaded 
on one factor (2=322.98, df=6, p<.05); (c) a two-factor model in which personal behavior and perceived peer 
behavior loaded on one factor (2=182.81, df=6, p<.05); and (d) a three-factor model omitting error-correlation 
estimates of projection (2=39.90, df=4, p<.05). Respectively, in comparison to the Figure-2 model’s RMSEA of 
.026, the above alternatives yielded poorer fits of .191, .153, .115, and .058. 
violence net of adjustments for gender and low self-control. As in Figure 2, and again following 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998), we model projection effects by estimating the correlation 
between error terms for manifest indicators of perceived friend’s behavior and corresponding 
error terms for manifest indicators of personal behavior. Two of the four error correlations are 
statistically significant, thus paralleling measurement results from Figure 2. Males have higher 
perceptions of friend’s violence and have lower levels of self-control. As expected, low self-
control is associated with greater personal violence, and males have higher levels of violence 
even after controlling for self-control and perceived peer violence. Most importantly, even after 
adjusting for the contemporaneous correlations among manifest indicators of perceived peer 
behavior and personal behavior, Figure 3 demonstrates that the structural coefficient linking 
perceived friend’s violence and personal violence is statistically significant and very high in 
magnitude. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Figure 4 examines the degree to which to which the error-correlation adjustments 
outlined by Matsueda and Anderson (1998) do or do not narrow the gap between perceived and 
directly-measured peer coefficients. In particular, it repeats the structural analysis presented in 
Figure 3 with two exceptions. First, it substitutes directly-measured peer behavior in place of 
perceived peer behavior. Second, given its direct measures of peer behavior, it does not estimate 
error term corrections. Comparing the structural coefficients across Figures 3 and 4 indicates 
clear evidence that, even after adjusting for error term correlations in Figure 3, the coefficient 
linking perceived peer behavior and personal behavior is still much larger in Figure 3 than is the 
corresponding coefficient linking directly-measured peer behavior and personal behavior in 
Figure 4. The Figure-4 coefficient, in fact, fails to reach statistical significance net of self-control 
and gender
5
 thus suggesting that the significant correlation between personal and directly-
measured peer behavior in Figure 2 is spurious. 
While the error correlations estimated in Figure 3 do not bring the Figure 3 peer 
coefficient fully into line with that of Figure 4, we note that two of these error correlations are 
significant. It therefore remains possible that omitting the error correlations in Figure 3 would 
yield an even more biased peer coefficient. To examine whether the error correlation strategy 
may at least limit the bias resulting from the use of perceived peer measures, we re-ran the model 
presented in Figure 3 and omitted these error correlation estimates. The resulting model yielded 
an unstandardized peer coefficient of 1.09 (SE=.18), as opposed to the original unstandardized 
coefficient of .93 (SE=.14). This suggests that, although estimating error correlations does not 
render perceived peer coefficients equivalent to direct peer coefficients, it does decrease them by 
about 15%, thus only partly mitigating the bias that characterizes perceptions of peer behavior.
6
 
Our results therefore call into question whether prior studies using the strategy outlined by 
Matsueda and Anderson (1998) with perceived peer measures can be said to produce peer 
coefficients equal to those that would emerge were direct peer measures available in such 
studies’ datasets. Rather, it would appear that the error term correlations in question do not serve 
to control for the contamination that results from such sources as projection and/or that 
perceptions of peer behavior reflect a construct that is greater than the sum of actual peer 
behavior and measurement bias. 
                                                 
5
 The corresponding coefficient from our maximum-likelihood model did achieve statistical significance, but the gap 
between Figure-3 and Figure-4 coefficients when using maximum-likelihood estimation was similar to the gap 
presented in Figures 3 and 4. Thus, conclusions about the research questions that we discuss at the outset were 
identical to those drawn from DWLS estimates, whose standard errors are likely to be more valid in light of the 
methodological literature we cite in our section entitled “2.4 Method of Estimation”. 
6
 Given that our alternative models have used the same sample with different measures of peer violence rather than 
the same measures of peer violence with different samples, it is not appropriate to compare the coefficients of 
alternative models via the Paternoster et al. (1998) formula.  
In light of the above results, it appears to us that the dominant paradigm for exploring the 
relationship between personal and peer delinquency may be fundamentally flawed insofar as it 
treats perceived and direct measures of peer delinquency as alternatives from which to choose 
rather than as fundamentally separate variables that might both be included in a full model of 
delinquency (for a notable exception, see Jussim and Osgood, 1989). In particular,  our 
measurement model suggests the latent variable correlation between perceived and direct peer 
measures to be significantly (and substantially) less than 1.0 and our structural models suggest 
that the relationship between personal delinquency and each of the two peer measures is vastly 
different even after applying error correlation adjustments suggested by Matsueda and Anderson 
(1998). We therefore provide a supplemental analysis assessing one way in which direct and 
perceived measures of peer delinquency may simultaneously be related to personal behavior. In 
particular, given that only the portion of peer delinquency that is known to respondents may 
impinge directly on respondent behavior, our model includes perceived peer behavior along with 
self-control and gender as direct predictors of personal violence. Simultaneously, however, the 
model includes directly-measured peer violence as a predictor of perceived peer violence. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
Results from our supplemental analysis are depicted in Figure 5. They replicate the 
Figure 4 finding that perceived peer behavior is strongly associated with personal behavior even 
after adjusting for low self-control. More critically, results suggest that perceptions of peer 
behavior are partly reflections of directly-measured peer behavior, that males attribute greater 
violence to their friends than is called for on the basis of directly-measured friend’s violence, and 
that those low in self-control perceive greater peer violence even after adjusting for gender and 
directly-measured peer violence. Most importantly, results depicted in Figure 5 reveal that more 
than sixty percent of perceived peer violence remains unexplained by gender, self-control, and 
directly-measured peer violence. Of note, although factor loadings have been omitted from 
Figure 5 for clarity of presentation, they appear in Appendix A and demonstrate that two of four 
error term correlations are once again statistically significant. Thus, sixty percent of perceived 
peer violence remains statistically unexplained net of controls and net of the very error term 
correlations that Matsueda and Anderson (1998) suggest to control for such mechanisms as 
projection, imputing friendship to co-offenders, and false rumors.  
(Figure 5 about here) 
4. DISCUSSION 
Despite criminological and psychological research demonstrating clear evidence that 
individuals misperceive the delinquency of their peers, measures of perceived peer delinquency 
will likely remain relevant in future etiological studies. Even as theorists like Akers (2009), for 
example, acknowledge the biases that might be claimed to affect the validity of such measures, 
they nevertheless observe that an individual’s perceptions may have etiological import in their 
own right, regardless of their inaccuracy. Moreover, relatively few datasets contain direct peer 
measures from dyadic or network data and the added effort required to collect such data may 
render them rare for some time to come. Thus, even insofar as direct peer delinquency measures 
are desirable in etiological studies of delinquency, practical considerations suggest that perceived 
peer measures will remain more commonly available.  
Given the continued importance of perceived peer delinquency, the present study 
addresses two questions about the relationship between personal and perceived peer delinquency. 
First, are perceived peer delinquency measures merely methodologically-biased representations 
of the same construct that is reflected by direct peer delinquency measures or are the measures 
reflections of fundamentally different theoretical constructs? Second, to what degree do latent 
variable adjustments render perceived peer coefficients equal to directly-measured peer 
coefficients? After first demonstrating that respondents in the present sample do appear to 
project their own behavioral tendencies inaccurately onto friends, results provide evidence that 
respondent perceptions are not merely biased by measurement, but may in fact reflect a 
theoretical construct fundamentally distinctive from directly-measured peer behavior. Likewise, 
structural equation results suggest that perceived measures of peer violence inflate the magnitude 
of the relation between personal and peer violence substantially, but that estimating 
corresponding error correlations among indicators of personal and perceived peer behavior does 
not methodologically counteract the majority of this inflation. 
In light of these findings, three fundamental implications emerge for both the 
interpretation of prior etiological research and for the construction of future tests aimed at 
unpacking the nature of the relationship between personal and peer delinquency. First, whether 
the manifest error term correlations estimated herein reflect projection, false rumors/bragging, 
shared method variance, or a combination of all three, they do not render perceived peer 
coefficients equal to direct peer coefficients. Therefore, studies using perceived peer measures, 
whether with or without error-correlation adjustments, cannot be interpreted as approximating 
the actual effect of peers, per se, on delinquency. Insofar as policy-makers are interested in the 
actual effect of peer behavior on delinquency, they will therefore need to rely on studies using 
explicit measures of peer behavior derived directly from the peers themselves. Decades of 
criminological research has, if often implicitly, assumed the strong relationship between personal 
and perceived peer delinquency to mean that peers themselves “matter” much more than do 
variables whose correlations with delinquency are relatively smaller (see Akers, 2009 for a 
detailed review). Yet if perceptions reflect a construct fundamentally distinctive from directly-
measured peer behavior, rather than merely measurement-biased indicators of actual peer 
delinquency, delinquency-prevention efforts that seek to isolate individuals from objectively 
delinquent peers may actually have little influence on subjective perceptions of peer behavior or 
on personal delinquency.  
Second, while scholars like Akers (2009) may ultimately be correct to suggest that 
perceptions of peer behavior are etiologically important in their own right, our results suggest a 
critical need for future research to conceive of perceptions as a dependent, rather than 
exclusively independent, variable (e.g., Young et al., 2011). Even if longitudinal research 
continues to find that perceptions of peer behavior exert a strong influence over a given 
individual’s delinquency (but see Rebellon, 2012), the criminological community’s ability to 
apply such knowledge for the practical purpose of preventing delinquency necessarily hinges on 
empirically identifying precise social stimuli capable of altering perceptions. Yet results of our 
supplemental model suggest that, even after unveiling significant independent associations of 
perceived peer delinquency with directly-measured peer delinquency, self-control, and gender, 
nearly seventy percent of the variance in perceptions of peer delinquency remained unexplained. 
Thus, even insofar as theorists like Akers (2009) claim that perceptions have etiological value 
independent of actual peer behavior, future theory and research would do well to focus less on 
comparing the magnitude of perceived peer coefficients with that of other predictors and to focus 
more attention on what precise social stimuli are most capable of altering inaccurate perceptions 
so as to usefully inform delinquency prevention policy. Absent further research aimed at 
identifying where (mis)perceptions come from (e.g., Young et al., 2011), policy-makers will 
continue to encounter evidence that delinquency-prevention hinges on changing perceptions of 
peer delinquency while simultaneously lacking a deep well of knowledge concerning how to go 
about the task of altering those perceptions. 
 Third, given that the present study finds what we believe to be compelling evidence that 
perceived and direct measures of peer delinquency are two fundamentally distinct constructs, we 
believe that criminologists should pay much greater attention to theorizing the manner in which 
both constructs are simultaneously related to personal delinquency (and to each other). Within 
the limited literature that has employed both measures in etiological analysis, the vast majority of 
studies have conceived of the two measures as alternatives from which to choose, rather than as 
fundamentally distinct constructs that may each contribute to delinquency (e.g., Meldrum et al., 
2009; Weerman and Smeenk, 2005; Haynie, 2001, 2002). This general approach dates back to 
the seminal contributions of such scholars as Newcomb (1961) and Kandel (1978), as well as to 
the broader false-consensus literature that flourished in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s 
(see Krueger and Clement, 1994; Marks and Miller, 1987). Yet the focus of even these precedent 
literatures revolved primarily around identifying how much “error” exists in perceived peer 
measures vis-à-vis actual measures of peer delinquency. Whereas the prior literatures’ focus has 
led most researchers to include one or the other measure within a given statistical model, our 
results suggest to us that it might be most appropriate to include both simultaneously in a full 
model of delinquency. Methodologically, including both may serve to prevent omitted variable 
bias while, theoretically, including both may provide a more accurate representation of the 
complex processes that link peers, perceptions, and personal behavior. 
 Given the above implications, we believe three issues merit particular attention in future 
research. First, we believe it is critical that future research attempt to replicate this study’s 
results. While we are not the first to suggest that replication often receives too little attention in 
criminology analysis (Lowenkamp et al., 2003), we echo this sentiment. Of particular 
importance, it may be the case that this study’s findings may apply to severe forms of 
delinquency like violence, but less so to more common behaviors like drinking or substance use. 
Notwithstanding the still mainstream view that all forms of delinquency are “general” 
phenomena, reflecting the same fundamental tendency and bearing common etiological 
antecedents, a developing research literature finds evidence that different forms of delinquency 
may not reflect identical underlying constructs (e.g., Rebellon and Waldman, 2003; Osgood and 
Schreck, 2007). Some forms of delinquency, for example, may be particularly prone to take 
place in groups, to be learned from peers, or to be reinforced in certain social contexts (Warr, 
2002; Rebellon 2006). Future research should therefore replicate the present findings with a 
similar focus on violence, but then also examine whether the present findings apply equally to 
other forms of delinquency. Even if further research replicates our findings for violence, it might 
still be the case that perceived and actual peer behaviors like substance use reflect the same 
underlying theoretical construct and that error-correlation adjustments render perceived peer 
substance use coefficients similar to actual peer substance use coefficients. For each of these 
reasons, we encourage replication of the present findings with a variety of delinquency measures 
and across a variety of cultures/subcultures. 
 Second, if research confirms that perceived and direct peer measures reflect 
fundamentally separate constructs, we encourage criminologists to construct and test theoretical 
models that include both. We have provided one preliminary example of such a model. Results 
show that after controlling for the expected significant relationships that self-control and 
biological sex bear with respondent violence, respondent violence was significantly associated 
with perceived peer violence. Perceived peer violence, in turn, was significantly associated with 
directly-measured peer violence. We note, however, that our model can only be viewed as 
preliminary in light of several data limitations including our identification of only one 
respondent-selected friend and a cross-sectional design that precludes our assessment of 
reciprocal influences across time. While our inclusion of self-control as a covariate may partly 
mitigate our inability to control for prior delinquency, we note that even after adjusting for self-
control, gender, directly-measured peer behavior, and shared method variance (via error 
correlation adjustments), nearly seventy percent of the variance in respondent perceptions of one 
friend’s behavior remains unexplained. Thus, we suggest that future research elaborate our 
preliminary test by building upon latent trait-state models emerging within the psychological 
literature (Geiser and Lockhart, 2012) and on the longitudinal methods of Jussim and Osgood’s 
(1989) analysis. While Jussim and Osgood’s research is often cited as evidence that perceptions 
of delinquency are inaccurate, this study’s greater import may actually stem from its longitudinal 
attempt to model projection effects via a method that, in light of the present results, may hold 
greater promise than error-correlation adjustments. In particular, we suggest that future 
criminological research modify Jussim and Osgood’s (1989) model for use with network, rather 
than only dyadic, data and for use with general adolescent samples rather officially-documented 
offender samples. 
 Third, future research should attempt to address a number of further limitations inherent 
to the present design. For example, although recent research suggests that university students 
provide valid samples for criminological research (Wiecko, 2010), our data come from a small 
convenience sample and are not representative of university students in general, let alone the 
overall population. However, while the generalizability of our results remains an open question, 
we note that one of our driving research questions was as assessment of whether latent variable 
corrections via error term correlation estimates render structural coefficients derived from 
perceived peer measures equal to those derived from direct peer measures. Whether the data used 
to examine this methodological issue are representative should not impinge on this question. If 
the error-term correction did not serve to bring structural coefficients from perceived peer 
models into line with those from direct peer models in our data, we see no methodological reason 
to expect the correction to work better in another data set simply on the basis that such data may 
be more representative. Further, the theories from which we derived our models are explicitly 
claimed to be general theories that should apply across time, across place, and across gender. It is 
instructive, for example, that our self-control measure worked as would be expected based on 
prior theory and based on prior empirical research. Likewise, gender, perceived peer behavior, 
and directly-measured peer behavior all yielded bivariate correlations with violence in the 
directions expected from the existing literature. 
Beyond the representativeness of our sample, our measures of perceived and actual peer 
violence are based on data from only one friend. Traditional measures of perceived peer 
delinquency, however, tend to ask about the proportion of one’s friends who have engaged in a 
given behavior. Preliminary research (see Haynie and Osgood, 2005) suggests that the proportion 
of delinquent friends, as measured via network data, may be more important than the amount of 
total crime that any one friend has committed. At the same time, this means that our study should 
reflect a conservative test. In particular, it is noteworthy that data from only one friend was 
sufficient to unveil an extremely strong and statistically significant relation between personal 
behavior and perceived peer behavior, even after controlling for self-control and gender, which 
represent two of the strongest and most consistent correlates of delinquency. Moreover, although 
our fit statistics suggest adequate model fit, we again note that our purpose was not to test a 
complete etiological model of respondent violence, but rather to (1) examine the discriminant 
validity of a perceived peer measure vis-à-vis a personal measure and a directly-measured peer 
measure and (2) and examine whether an error-adjusted measure of perceived peer delinquency 
could serve as a valid proxy for direct peer delinquency. Given the clearly stronger relation that 
our study finds between personal and perceived peer delinquency versus personal and directly-
measured peer delinquency, misperception for multiple friends is unlikely to be smaller. 
Similarly, if the latent variable adjustments in Figure 3 were not able to replicate structural 
results from Figure 4 using data from one friend, we have little reason to believe that they would 
be able to do so with data from multiple friends. 
Finally, we have used cross-sectional data and have implicitly assumed a friend’s self-
report is the gold-standard by which respondent perceptions should be judged. We encourage 
future research to replicate the above analyses via longitudinal designs, but point out that cross-
sectional designs have been deemed appropriate for exploring related issues in the recent past 
(e.g., Young et al., 2011; Boman et al., 2012). Further, our measurement models are not affected 
by the use of cross-sectional data and our structural models are primarily intended as a platform 
with which to test whether adjusting for measurement artifacts yields results comparable (aside 
from their etiologically validity) to results derived from models incorporating direct measures of 
peer delinquency.  We also recognize that there are likely multiple sources of potential error in 
peer self-reports. For example, it is possible that friends (and respondents themselves) are 
untruthful. We have attempted to guard against deliberate deception by ensuring participants of 
their anonymity but, even to the degree that respondents/friends attempted to answer accurately, 
their memory may be imperfect. However, while future research should not lose sight of the need 
to validate direct measures of peer behavior, prior research concludes that self-report 
methodology yields generally reliable and valid measures (e.g., Huizinga and Elliott, 1986).  
Further, the limits of our self-reported methodology are shared by numerable micro-level studies 
of crime using the same approach. 
Despite these limitations, our study provides an important latent variable test examining 
whether perceived peer behavior measures reflect measurement-biased indicators of directly-
measured peer behavior or instead reflect a construct fundamentally distinctive from directly-
measured peer behavior. Our findings demonstrate that perceived and direct peer measures 
reflect fundamentally separate constructs, at least for violence. Likewise, our study provides the 
first structural equation assessment of the degree to which error term corrections using perceived 
peer delinquency measures can successfully replicate results of models using direct peer 
delinquency measures. Our findings suggest that they cannot. Both of the above findings suggest 
that future research concerning the relationship between personal and peer behavior cannot 
bypass the collection of directly-measured peer delinquency. Instead, future research should 
build more systematically on Jussim and Osgood’s (1989) example by formulating and testing 
longitudinal models of delinquency that assign a role to both directly-measured and perceived 
peer delinquency. Beyond this, both findings further suggest that future theory and research 
should follow Young et al.’s (2011) lead in attempting to identify and model the specific sources 
of perceptions that remain theoretically and empirically unidentified. By further theorizing and 
researching what specific stimuli impinge most versus least in the development of perceptions, 
criminologists could prevent policy makers with limited resources from “concluding in 
frustration that everything matters” (Sampson, 1999:446).  
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`Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Min Max Mean SD Skew
Personal Violence
Pushed 269 1 9 2.04 1.481 1.957
Hit 269 1 9 1.88 1.450 2.348
Kicked 269 1 9 1.51 1.205 3.456
Forced 269 1 9 1.71 1.422 2.837
Perceived Friend's Violence
Pushed 268 1 8 1.88 1.414 1.909
Hit 268 1 9 1.80 1.381 2.353
Kicked 268 1 9 1.56 1.260 3.150
Forced 266 1 9 1.67 1.386 2.612
Direct Friend's Violence
Pushed 267 1 9 2.13 1.614 2.329
Hit 267 1 9 1.85 1.482 2.803
Kicked 267 1 7 1.50 1.016 2.906
Forced 267 1 9 1.65 1.299 3.071
Low Self-control
Impulsive 269 1 4 2.15 .509 .457
Simple Task 268 1 4 2.07 .532 .178
Risk 268 1 4 2.60 .625 -.213
Physical 268 1 4 2.68 .594 .188
Selfish 268 1 4 1.81 .571 .890
Temper 268 1 4 1.94 .631 .357
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 Appendix A: Measurement Model
a
Projection
Personal Perceived Direct Low Error Correlation
Friend Friend Self-control (Personal/Perceived)
Push .82* .91* .86* -- .06
Hit .83* .88* .89* -- .06
Kick .84* .89* .80* -- .14*
Force .85* .81* .69* -- .29*
Impulsive -- -- -- .56* --
Simple Task -- -- -- .31* --
Risk -- -- -- .65* --
Physical -- -- -- .44* --
Selfish -- -- -- .52* --
Temper -- -- -- .53* --
a
Loading for "Male" fixed to a value of 1.0 *p<.05
